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The Lack of Money is the Root of All Evil:
Louisiana’s Ban on Bail Without Surety
INTRODUCTION
Two brothers are arrested for the same crime—possession of
marijuana with the intent to distribute.1 They are in all respects the same
man: they have the same education, the same criminal record, and the same
ties to the community. They differ in only one respect: one brother has
money, while the other has none. Nevertheless, Louisiana law does not
treat these brothers the same. In fact, the brother with money will quickly
be out of jail, while the indigent brother will stay incarcerated for the entire
pretrial duration. The two brothers will experience vastly different pretrial
outcomes, solely because of their respective wealth.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 334.4 imposes a ban on
judges releasing defendants on their own recognizance when they are
charged with certain crimes.2 This ban might violate an indigent
defendant’s right to procedural due process, right to equal protection under
the law, and right to be free from excessive bail. Execution of the article
carries with it a host of deleterious effects.3 Litigation on the issue,
however, is rare. Because Article 334.4 exclusively governs bail, it applies
only to pretrial detention. Any challenge to the law therefore faces issues
of mootness and ripeness. There exists only one federal case in which a
petitioner challenged the law. In 2014, an arrestee challenged Article 334.4
in Faulkner v. Gusman, arguing that it violated his right to procedural due
process and his right to be free from excessive bail.4 Although the
challenge was unsuccessful, many of the concerns raised by the petitioner
remain.
Article 334.4 should be repealed. The article violates equal protection
rights by imposing pretrial detention on the extremely indigent solely
because of their inability to pay. This pretrial detention is statistically
linked to increased recidivism and poor trial outcomes. Article 334.4
violates due process by denying defendants the chance to show that they
are not a flight risk and that pretrial detention is not needed. Finally, the
Copyright 2016, by GABRIEL LOUPE.
1. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:966 (2016).
2. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 334.4 (2016). Releasing a defendant on his own
recognizance means releasing him for no monetary fee. Some jurisdictions refer to
this as “bail without surety.”
3. See infra Part IV.
4. Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213 (E.D. La. May 9,
2014).
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article violates the constitutional prohibition on excessive bail by mandating
bail even in cases where none is needed to ensure that the accused attends
trial.
Part I of this Comment provides a historical overview of bail, due
process, and Article 334.4. Part II discusses the challenge put forth in
Faulkner v. Gusman, including the state’s responses to the petition and the
ultimate judgment of the court. In Part III, newly released data on
Louisiana bond amounts is used to dispute several claims of the Faulkner
court and analyze the constitutionality of Article 334.4, concluding that
the article potentially violates procedural due process, equal protection,
and the excessive bail clauses of the Louisiana and the United States
constitutions. Finally, Part IV provides reasons for the repeal of Article
334.4 and explores policy considerations pursuant to such an action,
including the effects of pretrial detention on conviction rates and
sentencing.
I. BAIL, ARTICLE 334.4, AND POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES: A BRIEF PRIMER
Understanding the history of bail, due process, and equal protection is
necessary to understand the constitutional issues of Article 334.4. Bail
originated as an early Anglo-Saxon practice designed to manage a lack of
prisons. Over the centuries, it developed into a protection for citizens from
their government.5 Bail determinations in the United States are intimately
related to due process, which is guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.6 The Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection under the law also serves to protect indigent
citizens from unjust outcomes in criminal trials.7 Louisiana’s passage of
Article 334.4 implicates issues of excessive bail, due process, and equal
protection.

5. TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE ET AL., PRETRIAL JUDICIAL INST., THE HISTORY OF
BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 3 (2010), http://www.pretrial.org/download/pjireports/PJI-History%20of%20Bail%20Revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UGP-HS7G]
(“[Over 500 years, the English] Parliament focused on adding safeguards to the bail
process to protect persons from political abuse and local corruption.”).
6. See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
7. See generally Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe
Indigent Defense Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1197 (2013).
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A. A Brief History of Bail
The practice of bail has a history extending back millennia to the early
Roman Republic.8 Bail originally existed as a practical solution to the rarity
of prisons in the Anglo-Saxon period; in modern times, it has developed into
a required aspect of due process and the presumption of innocence. In
Anglo-Saxon England, an accused man would be released before trial if a
surety “would guarantee both the appearance of the accused at trial and
payment of [monetary fines] upon conviction.”9 Were the accused to flee
before trial, he would be presumed guilty, and the surety would be required
to pay the monetary fines of his conviction.10 Bail, therefore, was set at the
amount that would be paid should the accused be found guilty.
1. Bail in England
In 1275, the English Parliament passed the Statute of Westminster,
which modified the bail practices of the earlier Anglo-Saxon period.11 The
Statute required that sheriffs deny bail to three groups: (1) prisoners who
committed certain offenses; (2) those who self-incriminated, were caught in
the act, or were excommunicated; and (3) those who had attempted escape
or “those of ill fame or bad character.”12 For such a statute to be passed, it
would seem necessary that bail be granted frequently to the accused, if not
by default. Magna Carta’s requirement that no man be divested of liberty or
property without due process clearly shows that the English celebrated a
basic presumption of innocence.13 This presumption, codified in 1215, could
not have been forgotten by the passing of the Statute of Westminster 60
8. SCHNACKE, supra note 5, at 1. See also Andrew Lyons, Ancient Roman
Precedent for the Taking of Bail, HEARSAY, http://www.hearsay.org.au
/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=127&Itemid=48 [https://perma.cc
/PD64-NHCA] (last visited Sept. 4, 2016) (“There is a record of bail being taken as
far back as about 461 BC.”).
9. June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery
of Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 519–
20 (1983).
10. Id. at 520.
11. Id. at 523.
12. Id. at 520 n.38.
13. MAGNA CARTA *39 (Nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur, aut
disseisiatur, aut utlagetur, aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur . . . nisi per
legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem terre. Literally, “No free man may
be taken, or imprisoned, or deprived of property, or outlawed, or exiled, or by any
other mode brought to ruin . . . except by the legal judgment of his equals or by
the law of the land.”).
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years later; the Statute served to temper Magna Carta’s liberal bail rules. By
the time of the American Declaration of Independence, bail in the United
Kingdom had become a strong shield of liberty against the Crown.14
2. Bail in the United States
Bail practices in the United States originated from this long history of
bail in the United Kingdom. In the 17th century, Parliament passed multiple
bills of legislation granting subjects of the Crown increased rights of bail.15
Among these were (1) the Petition of Right, which forbade courts to detain
subjects without charging them; (2) the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which
created procedural safeguards to prevent lengthy pretrial delays; and (3) the
English Bill of Rights of 1689, which stated that “excessive bail ought not
be required.”16 The United States Constitution, mirroring this latter
convention, established that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.”17 The
United States Supreme Court has held that “[u]nless [the] right to bail before
trial is preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries
of struggle, would lose its meaning.”18 In United States v. Salerno, the Court
held constitutional the Bail Reform Act, which permits federal courts to
deny bail to certain dangerous arrestees;19 however, it stipulated that “[i]n
our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is
the carefully limited exception.”20
The federal system of bail follows this guideline. Federal law prohibits
a judicial officer from “impos[ing] a financial condition that results in the
pretrial detention of the person.”21 The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
however, has repeatedly held that a defendant’s inability to post bail does
not by itself render a bail setting unconstitutionally excessive.22 The court
14. Carbone, supra note 9, at 528.
15. Id.
16. SCHNACKE, supra note 5, at 3–4.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
18. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (holding that bail had been assigned
in excess when the district court had assigned $50,000 bail to members of the
Communist Party solely on the basis that former arrestees charged with violating
the same law had forfeited bail).
19. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (holding that the Bail
Reform Act, which permits federal courts to deny bail to certain dangerous
arrestees, was constitutional).
20. Id. at 755.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (2012).
22. United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
that a $750,000 bail was not excessive, because “only a substantial financial
component” would reasonably assure the court of the defendant’s appearance)

2016]

COMMENT

113

has also held that the interpretation of federal bail law claiming that district
courts were barred from setting a level of bail that the defendant could not
afford to post was “inconsistent with the total fabric of the Bail Reform Act
of 1984, as amended in 1986, inconsistent with apparent congressional
purpose, and not supported by the legislative history.”23 Rather, the court
has held that the Bail Reform Act merely “proscrib[es] the setting of a high
bail as a de facto automatic detention practice.”24
The states are free to pursue other systems of bail within the constraints
of the Eighth Amendment. Louisiana’s Constitution of 1978, mirroring the
United States Constitution, prohibits excessive bail but does not grant a right
to bail.25 Louisiana law requires that bail be assessed under ten factors and
(citing Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that the
constitutionality of a Florida bail law was moot because the Supreme Court of
Florida had promulgated a new law superseding it)); United States v. James, 674
F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that under 18 U.S.C.S. § 3146, a trial judge
may amend conditions of release set by a magistrate); United States v. Beaman,
631 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that a local federal rule requiring defendant
to post real property within the jurisdiction of the district court with twice the
value of the bond to obtain release was in conflict with 18 U.S.C. § 3146);
Williams v. Farrior, 626 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (holding that a plaintiff
failed to adequately assert a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 when a sheriff
refused to approve a bond, because the plaintiff did not possess an absolute right
to bail).
23. McConnell, 842 F.2d at 108.
24. Id. at 109. It should be noted that for the purposes of this analysis, a “high
bail” is “a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person,”
as proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2).
25. LA. CONST. art. I, § 18 reads:
A. Excessive bail shall not be required. — Before and during a trial, a person
shall be bailable by sufficient surety, except when he is charged with a
capital offense and the proof is evident and the presumption of guilt is great.
After conviction and before sentencing, a person shall be bailable if the
maximum sentence which may be imposed is imprisonment for five years
or less; and the judge may grant bail if the maximum sentence which may
be imposed is imprisonment exceeding five years. After sentencing and
until final judgment, a person shall be bailable if the sentence actually
imposed is five years or less; and the judge may grant bail if the sentence
actually imposed exceeds imprisonment for five years.
B. However, a person charged with a crime of violence as defined by law
or with production, manufacture, distribution, or dispensing or possession
with intent to produce, manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled
dangerous substance as defined by the Louisiana Controlled Dangerous
Substances Law, and the proof is evident and the presumption of guilt is
great, shall not be bailable if, after a contradictory hearing, the judge or
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“insure the presence of the defendant, as required, and the safety of any other
person and the community.”26 Louisiana’s Code of Criminal Procedure
explicitly defines bail as “the security given by a person to assure his
appearance before the proper court whenever required.”27 In 2012, the
Louisiana legislature enacted Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article
334.4, which provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, any
defendant who has been arrested . . . shall not be released by the court
on the defendant’s own recognizance or on the signature of any other
person [when arrested for] . . . the production, manufacturing,
distribution, or dispensing or the possession with the intent to
produce, manufacture, distribute or dispense a controlled dangerous
substance in violation of R.S. 40:966(B), 967(B), 968(B), 969(B), or
970(B) of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law.28

magistrate finds by clear and convincing evidence that there is a substantial
risk that the person may flee or poses an imminent danger to any other
person or the community.
26. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 334 (2016). The ten factors are:
(1) The seriousness of the offense charged, including but not limited to
whether the offense is a crime of violence or involves a controlled
dangerous substance.
(2) The weight of the evidence against the defendant.
(3) The previous criminal record of the defendant.
(4) The ability of the defendant to give bail.
(5) The nature and seriousness of the danger to any other person or the
community that would be posed by the defendant’s release.
(6) The defendant’s voluntary participation in a pretrial drug testing
program.
(7) The absence or presence of any controlled dangerous substance in the
defendant’s blood at the time of arrest.
(8) Whether the defendant is currently out on bond on a previous felony
arrest for which he is awaiting institution of prosecution, arraignment,
trial, or sentencing.
(9) Any other circumstances affecting the probability of defendant’s
appearance.
(10) The type or form of bail.
27. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 311 (2016).
28. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 334.4 (2016). This law also prohibits release
on the arrestee’s recognizance when accused of: vehicular homicide,
cyberstalking with two prior convictions for the same offense, aggravated
kidnapping of a child, killing a child during delivery, human experimentation,
cruelty to persons with infirmities with a prior conviction for the same offense,
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This law implicates issues of due process and equal protection. By
forbidding bail hearings in cases of possession of controlled substances with
the intent to distribute, Article 334.4 denies arrestees the right to be heard in
a meaningful manner during a critical phase of detention.
B. Facial Challenges to Due Process29
The United States Constitution guarantees a right to due process in state
criminal proceedings.30 The U.S. Supreme Court has defined “[t]he
fundamental requisite of due process of law [as] the opportunity to be heard
. . . at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”31 This “opportunity
to be heard” is the procedural component of due process. Due process also
contains a substantive component that protects a small set of rights “implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty,”32 regardless of procedure, unless the
government interference serves a compelling state interest.33 Louisiana’s
constitution and jurisprudence generally mirror that of the federal law.34
operating a vehicle while intoxicated with a prior conviction for the same offense,
aggravated cruelty to animals, and the injury or killing of a police animal. Id.
29. A facial challenge is a challenge in which a petitioner seeks to show that
“no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be [constitutionally]
valid.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[No] State [shall] deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
31. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (citations omitted) (holding
that due process required a hearing before the termination of welfare).
32. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1937).
33. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993) (holding that a law generally
requiring that minors detained before deportation may only be released to parents,
relatives, or guardians does not violate due process) (“[T]he Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments' guarantee of ‘due process of law’ . . . include[s] a substantive
component, which forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’
liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”); see also Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (holding that a law banning euthanasia
served a legitimate government interest and therefore did not violate due process)
(“The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair process, and the ‘liberty’ it
protects includes more than the absence of physical restraint.”).
34. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, except by due process of law.”). See also In re Adoption of B.G.S.,
556 So. 2d 545, 549 (La. 1990) (holding that statutes allowing a mother to
surrender children for adoption without putting the name of the unwed father on
the birth certificate violated the father’s right to due process) (“The central
meaning of procedural due process is well settled: Persons whose rights may be
affected by State action are entitled to be heard, and in order that they may enjoy
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The guiding jurisprudence for procedural due process challenges35 is
derived from Mathews v. Eldridge, in which the U.S. Supreme Court
established a test that weighs three factors.36 First, a court must examine
whether the challenged procedure affects a “private interest.”37 Second,
the court must determine the risk that the challenged procedure will
“erroneous[ly] depriv[e]” a person of that interest and the “probable value,
if any, of additional procedural safeguards.”38 Finally, the court must
decide whether the government has a sufficient interest to justify the
procedure in light of the prior two factors.39 Substantive due process
analysis is therefore incorporated into the Mathews test; if a challenged
procedure violates a liberty protected by substantive due process, only a
sufficiently compelling government interest will rescue the procedure
from being declared unconstitutional.40 A law that is procedurally sound,
however, may still discriminate against different members of the
citizenry.41 Such a law is vulnerable to a challenge under the Equal
Protection Clause.

that right, they must first be notified. It is equally fundamental that the right to
notice and an opportunity to be heard must be granted at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner.”); Babineaux v. Judiciary Commission, 341 So. 2d 396,
400 (La. 1976) (holding that a canon of the code of judicial conduct “prohibiting
judges from serving on the board of directors of financial institutions” does not
violate judges’ rights to due process) (“Substantive due process may be broadly
defined as the constitutional guaranty that no person shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his life, liberty, or property. The essence of substantive due process is
protection from arbitrary and unreasonable action.”).
35. Strictly speaking, the Mathews test is more properly applied as the third
stage of a due process analysis, after the questions “Is there a liberty deprivation?”
and “Is the deprivation of life, liberty or property?” See Erwin Chemerinsky,
Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 TOURO L. REV. 871 (2000) (discussing the
steps of procedural due process questions).
36. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (holding that evidentiary
hearings were not required by due process before the termination of disability).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the Court
must evaluate statutes infringing on substantive due process by means of strict
scrutiny).
41. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Edu. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (holding that
segregation of educational facilities violated equal protection).
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C. Facial Challenges to Equal Protection
The Constitution requires that states grant equal protection under the
law to all persons within their jurisdictions.42 The U.S. Supreme Court has
interpreted this requirement to mean that poverty cannot be the sole cause
of incarceration.43 For this reason, many statutory bail schemes risk
running afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fifth Circuit has a long history of cases involving criminal
prosecutions, indigence, and equal protection. It has defined “equal
protection of the laws” to mean, inter alia, “the right to be tried and
punished in the same manner as others accused of crime are tried and
punished,”44 and the Fifth Circuit has further held that “[t]o imprison an
indigent when in the same circumstances an individual of financial means
would remain free constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws.”45
Varden v. City of Clanton, a case from early 2015, is illustrative. In
Varden, an indigent woman was imprisoned because of her inability to pay
an amount of money required by the City of Clanton’s bail schedule and
filed suit against the city.46 In the suit, she alleged a violation of her

42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. (“[No] State [shall] . . . deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
43. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (holding that a defendant was
unconstitutionally sentenced to prison solely because he could not pay fines);
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240–41 (1970) (holding that an inmate could
not be kept beyond the duration of his incarceration if he were unable to pay fines)
(“We conclude that when the aggregate imprisonment exceeds the maximum
period fixed by the statute and results directly from an involuntary nonpayment
of a fine or court costs we are confronted with an impermissible discrimination
that rests on ability to pay.”); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961) (holding
that a state’s refusal to docket a petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the
petitioner was unable to pay a $4 fee) (“[T]o interpose any financial consideration
between an indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to sue
for his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws.”); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding that a state’s refusal to furnish
prisoners with copies of their trial records for their appeal because they were
unable to pay constituted discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment) (“[T]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has.”).
44. Lynch v. U.S., 189 F.2d 476, 479 (5th Cir. 1951).
45. Barnett v. Hopper, 548 F.2d 550, 554 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot,
439 U.S. 1041 (1978).
46. First Amended Class Action Complaint, Varden v. City of Clanton, No.
2:15-cv-34-MHT-WC (N.D. Ala. filed Jan. 15, 2015).
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Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.47 The United States filed
a statement of interest in support of the petitioner.48 In this statement of
interest, the United States claimed that incarcerating arrestees solely on
the grounds that they could not pay for release, regardless of the nature of
the required payment, is a violation of equal protection.49
In terms of reviewing the constitutionality of bail schemes, an equal
protection analysis may apply varying levels of scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is
appropriate when a law prevents the free exercise of a fundamental right
or discriminates against a suspect class of individuals.50 The indigent
might be specified as a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause.51
For a law to pass strict scrutiny, it must be “narrowly tailored to further
compelling governmental interests.”52 Due process and equal protection,
however, do not provide the only potential challenges to bail laws.
Arrestees have a constitutional protection against excessive bail.

47. Id.
48. Statement of Interest of the United States at 2, Varden v. City of Clanton,
No. 2:15-cv-34-MHT-WC (N.D. Ala. filed Jan. 15, 2015) (“The United States has
authority to file this Statement of Interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 517, which
permits the Attorney General to attend to the interests of the United States in any
case pending in a federal court. The United States can enforce the rights of the
incarcerated pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1997.”).
49. Id. at 1.
50. Mass. Bd. Of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (holding
that strict scrutiny was an improper test to use in analyzing a statute mandating
retirement at 50 for state police).
51. See San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 61 (1973)
(holding that a system of school funding based on local taxation passed rational
basis scrutiny and therefore did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment) (“[T]here
are other classifications that, at least in some settings, are also ‘suspect’—for
example, those based upon national origin, alienage, indigency, or illegitimacy.”);
but see Henry Rose, The Poor as a Suspect Class Under the Equal Protection
Clause: An Open Constitutional Question, 34 NOVA L. REV. 407 (2010) (claiming
that the status of the poor under the Equal Protection Clause remains an open
question).
52. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (holding that diversity
standards for Michigan law schools passed strict scrutiny and did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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D. Excessive Bail
The United States Constitution prohibits excessive bail.53 The United
States Supreme Court has not determined, however, whether the Eighth
Amendment grants citizens a fundamental right to bail.54 The Court has
suggested that because the Eighth Amendment originates from the English
Bill of Rights Act, from which English courts have not found a right to
bail, no such right stems from the Eighth Amendment.55 Still, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana has held that a
“limited fundamental right to bail” exists.56 This limited fundamental right
grants “fair access to the bail system for those who, after an individualized
judicial determination, qualify for pretrial release.”57 The Fifth Circuit has
since held that “there is no absolute constitutional right to bail.”58
E. Challenges to Article 334.4
Despite these constitutional concerns, challenges to Article 334.4 are
rare. Because Article 334.4 is applicable only to arrestees before their trial,
challenges face issues of mootness and ripeness. If arrestees challenge
their pretrial detention after they post bond or receive a trial, their claims
are mooted.59 If citizens challenge Article 334.4 before their arrest, their

53. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
54. See Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (holding that an Illinois
bail scheme did not violate equal protection or due process) (“But we are not at
all concerned here with any fundamental right to bail or with any Eighth
Amendment-Fourteenth Amendment question of bail excessiveness.”).
55. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545-46 (1952) (holding that the denial
of bail to aliens did not violate the eighth amendment) (“The bail clause was lifted
with slight changes from the English Bill of Rights Act. In England that clause
has never been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide
that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail. When
this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, nothing was said that indicated
any different concept. . . . Indeed, the very language of the Amendment fails to
say all arrests must be bailable. We think, clearly, here that the Eighth Amendment
does not require that bail be allowed under the circumstances of these cases.”).
56. Augustus v. Roemer, 771 F. Supp. 1458, 1465 (E.D. La. 1991).
57. Id.
58. Broussard v. Parish of Orleans, 318 F.3d 644 (5th Cir. 2003).
59. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975) (finding that the majority
of claims regarding pretrial detention must be “capable of repetition yet evading
review” in order to avoid mootness).
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claims are not ripe.60 The window to make a successful challenge against
Article 334.4 is therefore very small; however, in 2014, an arrestee made
a timely challenge to the law on several grounds.61 This suit provides an
excellent lens into the current state of opinion on Article 334.4.
II. FAULKNER V. GUSMAN: THE CURRENT STATE
OF JURISPRUDENCE ON ARTICLE 334.4
In 2013, Milton Faulkner challenged Article 334.4 in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, claiming that the law
violated both his right to be free from excessive bail and his right to due
process.62 Faulkner had been arrested for possession with intent to
distribute and was denied release on his own recognizance under Article
334.4, even though he posed virtually no risk for flight or recidivism. 63
Faulkner filed for habeas corpus relief in the Eastern District of Louisiana,
alleging that his due process rights were being violated.64 After a series of
filings by Faulkner and the state, the court denied Faulkner’s petition,
holding that Article 334.4 served a legitimate public interest and that
Faulkner’s facial challenge to the article’s constitutionality failed to prove
that the law was unconstitutional in every application.65
A. Background of the Case
In September 2013, Milton Faulkner was arrested for possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute and was booked in Orleans Parish
Prison.66 The next day, New Orleans Pretrial Services screened Faulkner
and determined that he had no prior convictions and was in the lowest risk
category for reoffending or fleeing.67 Following his screening, Faulkner
appeared in magistrate court for a “first appearance,” which combines the
60. See Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (“A claim is not
ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur
as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.”).
61. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813,
2014 WL 1876213 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014).
62. Id. at *3.
63. Id. at *5.
64. Id. at *3.
65. Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213 (E.D. La. May 9,
2014).
66. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813,
2014 WL 1876213 at *2 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014).
67. Id. at *5.
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probable cause hearing and bond determination required by law.68 Under
Article 334.4, the court was unable to consider the option of releasing
Faulkner on his own recognizance.69 The court set Faulkner’s bond at
$30,000.70
B. Initial Complaint
Faulkner filed a motion with the state district court alleging that his
bond had been unconstitutionally set, in violation of his right to due
process and freedom from excessive bail.71 The court denied his motion,
and the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal and Louisiana Supreme
Court denied review.72 On January 15, 2014, Faulkner filed a petition in
federal district court for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.73
Faulkner argued that Article 334.4 was unconstitutional “because it
deprive[d] [him] of an individualized hearing where a judge may
determine the appropriateness of a recognizance bond and results in
excessive bail for indigents who cannot post monetary bond.”74
Faulkner analogized Article 334.4 to a hypothetical bond restriction
analyzed in Pugh v. Rainwater.75 In Pugh, the Fifth Circuit analyzed a Florida
law on bail that created a presumption against release on one’s own
recognizance.76 The court held that although the Florida law was not facially
violative of the Equal Protection Clause,77 a situation in which “an indigent,
whose appearance at trial could reasonably be assured by one of the alternate
forms of release, [was subject to] pretrial confinement for inability to post
money bail would constitute imposition of an excessive restraint.”78 Faulkner
argued that Article 334.4 went “much further” than the hypothetical law
determined to be unconstitutional in Pugh, because Article 334.4 is an outright
ban on recognizance bonds when an arrestee is charged with a specific
crime.79
68. Id. (citing State v. Wallace, 25 So. 3d 720, 725 (2009)).
69. Id. at *2–3.
70. Id. at *3.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *7.
75. Id. at *8.
76. Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978).
77. Id. at 1056.
78. Id. at 1058.
79. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813,
2014 WL 1876213 at *8 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014).
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Faulkner claimed that Article 334.4 failed the three-factor Mathews test
and therefore violated his procedural due process rights.80 First, Faulkner
argued that an arrestee’s interest in pretrial release satisfied the first factor,81
because such an interest in release is a “private interest . . . affected by the
official action.”82 Second, he argued that prohibiting judges from considering
the possibility of releasing an arrestee on his own recognizance satisfied the
second factor83 by increasing the risk of “erroneous deprivation” of his liberty
interest in release.84 Third, Faulkner claimed that prohibiting release on one’s
own recognizance satisfied no legitimate government interest because judges
are required to hold bond hearings in every case, and either banning or
permitting judges to release arrestees on their own recognizance would not
add any “fiscal or administrative burden” to the state.85 Last, Faulkner argued
that other federal district courts have ruled similar provisions of law
unconstitutional.86 He analogized Article 334.4 to the Adam Walsh
Amendments (“AWA”),87 which require certain bond conditions for
defendants arrested for certain sexual offenses.88 Several federal courts have
found these required conditions to violate procedural due process.89

80. Id. at *10 (“Each of the three Mathews factors indicates that Article
334.4’s per se rule violates procedural due process requirements.”).
81. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
82. Id. at 335.
83. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813,
2014 WL 1876213 at *10 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014).
84. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
85. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813,
2014 WL 1876213 at *10–11 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014).
86. Id. at *12.
87. The Adam Walsh Amendments and the myriad bond conditions
contained within them are codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1).
88. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813,
2014 WL 1876213 at *12 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014).
89. Id. at *12–13 (citing United States v. Karper, 847 F. Supp. 2d 350, 360
(N.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[The mandatory condition] universally forfeits an accused’s
opportunity to contest whether such conditions are necessary to ensure his return
and to ameliorate any danger to the community.”); United States v. Torres, 566 F.
Supp. 2d 591, 596–99 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (“[The law] prevents the courts from
evaluating and setting relevant conditions of pretrial release, and, instead,
mandates conditions which implicate significant liberty interests.”).
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C. State Response
In its response, Louisiana denied each of Faulkner’s claims.90 The state
argued that Faulkner’s claim that he had a right to an individualized bond
hearing was a mischaracterization of federal law.91 It asserted that no
defendant is entitled to considerations “beyond questions of the severity of the
offense, the defendant’s flight risk, and his risk of danger to the community.”92
The state argued that arrestees have no “absolute right” to bail93 and that to
apply Mathews to an issue of bail determination would be inappropriate
because Mathews is only properly applicable to issues where a “specific Due
Process right . . . had been recognized and where the actions of the
Government and the trial court defanged that right.”94 Louisiana further
claimed that Pugh was distinguishable from the instant case.95 The state
argued that the Fifth Circuit in Pugh objected to a hypothetical bond schedule
where money bail would be fixed per offense.96 Because Article 334.4 is not
a master bond schedule, but rather a ban on release on one’s own
recognizance, the state argued that Pugh did not apply.97
90. Answer to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, Faulkner
v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213 at *5 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014)
(“Faulkner’s claims, and the arguments in support thereof, lack merit and are
based on a wholesale mischaracterization of controlling federal precedent as well
as a fundamental misunderstanding of the rationale behind the Excessive Bail
Clause.”).
91. Id. at *6–7 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754-55 (1987))
(“The ‘individualized inquiry’ relevant to the decision whether, and on what
conditions, to admit a defendant to bail is limited to whether he or she poses a risk
of flight or danger to the community if released pending trial, in light of the
seriousness of his or her alleged conduct.”).
92. Id.
93. Id. at *8 (first citing Broussard v. Parish of Orleans, 318 F.3d 644, 650
(5th Cir. 2003) (“[T]here is no absolute constitutional right to bail.”); then citing
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752 (“The Eighth Amendment . . . of course, says nothing
about whether bail shall be available at all.”)).
94. Id. at *7–8 (first citing United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309 (2d Cir.
2004); then citing United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d 591, 597 (W.D. Tex.
2008) (“The [Mathews] inquiry involves a two step analysis. First, the court must
identify the existence of a protected liberty or property interest.”)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at *8.
97. Id. at *9 (“The Pugh court’s concern about the constitutionality of setting a
monetary bond based on a master bond schedule ‘without meaningful consideration
of other possible alternatives’ simply does not bear upon the issue presently before
this Court, let alone bolster Faulkner’s argument.”).
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Furthermore, the state argued that Faulkner’s reference to AWA
jurisprudence was unavailing.98 First, the state noted that federal district courts
were not united in rejecting the statute’s provisions as unconstitutional.99
Second, it claimed that the AWA “created appreciably more onerous burdens”
on the liberty of those whom it affected than Article 334.4.100 It argued that
Faulkner could be released by the payment of bond, at which point he would
not experience liberty restrictions; Article 334.4 only “deprived Faulkner of .
. . the privilege of being released on his own recognizance.”101
Finally, the state disputed Faulkner’s claim that his bond was
unconstitutionally excessive.102 The state’s central argument was that
“prohibitions on the type of bonds available to a particular defendant have no
bearing on the excessiveness of the defendant’s bail because the question of
excessiveness is one of amount.”103 It argued that the United States Supreme
Court in Salerno prohibited only bail that is unreasonably high or bail that is
denied without an explanation.104 The state claimed that Article 334.4 does
neither of these things and therefore cannot be in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.105

98. Id. at *11.
99. Id. (first citing United States v. Frederick, 10-30021, 2010 WL 2179102
(D.S.D. May 27, 2010); then citing United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903
(E.D. Cal. 2009); then citing United States v. Cossey, 637 F. Supp. 2d 881 (D.
Mont. 2009); then citing United States v. Crites, 09-262, 2009 WL 2982782 (D.
Neb. Sept. 11, 2009); and then citing United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d
1025 (N.D. Cal. 2007)).
100. Answer to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition for Habeas Corpus Relief, Faulkner
v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213 at *5 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014) (“The
Torres court identified the liberty interests at stake therein as the ‘right to remove
from one place to another according to inclination’ and the ‘decision to remain in
a public place of [one’s] choice.’”).
101. Id. at *14–15.
102. Id. at *13.
103. Id.
104. Id. at *14–15.
105. Id. (“What art. 334.4 does not do is deny Faulkner bail altogether or establish
prophylactically an excessive amount of bail due to his purported commission of an
enumerated offense. Art. 334.4 likewise does not deny Faulkner a hearing at which
the magistrate or district judge sets an amount of bail appropriate to assure his
appearance at trial, based on his particular propensities for flight and danger to the
community and in light of the seriousness of his offense.”).
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D. Petitioner Response to the State
Faulkner disputed the state’s claim that Mathews was inapplicable.106 He
claimed that a Mathews analysis was relevant if Faulkner had an interest and
not necessarily a right to release.107 As such, he claimed that Article 334.4
implicated procedural due process.108 Faulkner argued that because he had an
interest in release, “the state must provide him with minimal procedural
protections before denying him release.”109 Faulkner argued once more that
Pugh was applicable.110 He interpreted the Pugh court’s dicta that to deny an
indigent arrestee pretrial release when that arrestee’s appearance at court
could “reasonably be assured by one of the alternate forms of release”111 to
mean that certain people have a right to be released on their own
recognizance.112 Faulkner emphasized that the rarity of statutes like Article
334.4 in other states is responsible for a dearth of case law on the topic113 and

106. Reply to the State’s Answer to the Petition for Habeas Corpus, Faulkner
v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213 at *1 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014).
107. Id. (“The state’s argument is based on the faulty assumption that the due
process protections recognized in Mathews v. Eldridge do not apply in this case
because Mr. Faulkner has no right to be released on his own recognizance. But
the state’s argument misses the point because the issue in a Mathews analysis is
not whether Mr. Faulkner has a right to release—it is whether he has an interest
in being released. And the Supreme Court has recognized that criminal defendants
have a liberty interest—if not a right—in being released pending trial.”).
108. Id.
109. Id. at *2. (“The Court, in fact, has specifically rejected the state’s
suggestion that Mathews applies only when an individual has a right to a certain
type of relief. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (applying due
process protections to parole revocation hearings).”).
110. Id.
111. Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1058 (5th Cir. 1978).
112. Reply to the State’s Answer to the Petition for Habeas Corpus, Faulkner
v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213 at *3 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014) (“A
Fifth Circuit panel overturned the Florida statute because it failed to codify a
presumption in favor of recognizance bonds. The en banc court reversed, but only
because the court wanted to give Florida judges the opportunity to adopt a
preference for recognizance bonds. And Pugh’s reasoning leaves little doubt that
the court disapproved of recognizance restrictions.”).
113. Id. at 4 (“[T]he state is left only with the argument that Abuhamra is not
directly on point. True. But this is likely because Article 334.4 is such an
uncommon statute.”).
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claimed that all statutes that ban release on one’s own recognizance have been
overturned by state courts.114
E. The Court’s Ruling
The federal district court, siding with the state on every issue, denied
Faulkner’s petition.115 The court found that to sustain a facial challenge to
Article 334.4, Faulkner needed to prove that the law is “unconstitutional in all
of its applications.”116 To prove this unconstitutionality, Faulkner needed to
show that Article 334.4 had no “plainly legitimate sweep,” or that the article
did not rationally further any government interest.117 The court noted that
facial challenges are “disfavored,” because “they raise the risk of ‘premature
interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually barebones records.’”118
The court held that Article 334.4 did not violate procedural due
process.119 It ruled that to sustain a procedural due process challenge, Faulkner
needed to prove that “Article 334.4 [was] procedurally inadequate in all, or
nearly all, of its applications, not as applied to a particular set of
defendants.”120 The court found that Article 334.4 did not deprive arrestees of
a liberty interest, because it neither mandated pretrial detention nor sets a
minimum bond amount.121 Central to the court’s reasoning was the claim that
even if Article 334.4 bars judges from releasing pretrial detainees on their own
recognizance, those judges may set “very low, even nominal, money
bonds.”122 The court quoted a state judge as saying “the DA’s office is right
in their argument that we can set the bond as low as we want. . . . [I can] give
him a bond of . . . $1,000, $500 or . . . $10.”123
114. Id. at 9 (first citing State v. Blake, 642 So. 2d 959 (Ala. 1994); then citing
State v. Raymond, 906 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 2005); and then citing Clark v. Hall, 53
P.3d 416 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002)).
115. Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213, at *1 (E.D. La. May
9, 2014).
116. Id. at *2 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party,
552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008)).
117. Id.
118. Id. (quoting Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609 (2004)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at *3.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *9.
123. Id. at *2 (“A defendant charged with one of Article 334.4’s enumerated
offenses may argue that the statutory factors favor a low or nominal money bond
in his case. If the judge agrees, she may set bond in an amount the defendant can
satisfy, be it a hundred dollars or ten dollars or even ten cents. If the judge does
not agree, and concludes that the defendant poses a flight risk or a danger to the
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The Eastern District found that the state’s procedures were
constitutionally sufficient and asserted that even if Article 334.4 affected
a liberty interest, the risk of that interest being erroneously deprived would
be so low that it would not implicate procedural due process.124 The court
noted that the Code of Criminal Procedure instructs judges to consider ten
separate factors when assigning bail125 and reiterated that judges were still
free to set nominal bail amounts, because Article 334.4 prohibits only
release on the arrestee’s recognizance.126 Because Faulkner mounted a
facial challenge to the law, the court interpreted the law in the most lenient
manner.127 Although the court recognized that situations might arise in
which poverty led to unconstitutional discrimination, Faulkner’s facial
challenge meant that the court was unable to entertain hypothetical
cases128: “The only circumstance in which this might plausibly occur is
when the defendant is unable to post even a de minimis money bond. In
ruling on Faulkner's facial challenge, however, the Court may not
‘speculate about “hypothetical” or “imaginary” cases.’”129
Finally, the court found that Article 334.4 serves a legitimate state
interest by protecting the public.130 The court found that the state
legislature intended to “signal[] to judges . . . [the importance of the]
potential flight risk or threat to public safety,” but, nonetheless, it accepted
that it only “serves the State’s interest in public safety to a slight degree.”131

community, then Article 334.4 is unlikely to have any effect, as the judge would
likely set a money bond even in the absence of Article 334.4.”).
124. Id. at *3.
125. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 311 (2016).
126. Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213, at *4 (E.D. La.
May 9, 2014).
127. Id. at *2 (“For purposes of Faulkner’s facial challenge, the Court must
assume that judges will apply the statutorily mandated factors in good faith when
setting bail for defendants charged with one of Article 334.4’s enumerated
offenses.”).
128. For example, the possibility of an event being “capable of repetition, yet
evading review,” as in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), or the hypothetical case
central to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 (5th
Cir. 1978).
129. Id. at *2 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party,
552 U.S. 442, 450 (2008)).
130. Id. at *5 (“[T]he Louisiana legislature determined that these offenses are
of sufficient gravity, and occasion a sufficient flight risk or risk of danger to the
community, to warrant mandatory imposition of a money bond.”).
131. Id. The court found that “the State has no evident fiscal or administrative
interest in Article 334.4’s per se bond restrictions, since judges could easily
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Given the serious effects of pretrial detention, the court’s acceptance of
Article 334.4 is troubling. Additionally, the court’s willingness to permit the
continued existence of the article raises constitutional concerns.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ARTICLE 334.4
In spite of the Faulkner court’s ruling, Article 334.4 implicates issues
of due process and equal protection. Analysis of state data indicates that
judges do not set nominal bonds.132 Additionally, because Faulkner made
a facial challenge to Article 334.4, the court interpreted the article with the
most leniency.133 The article may still deny certain classes of arrestees,
especially the homeless, their rights to equal protection and due process.
A. Louisiana Bond Data Shows That Judges Do Not Set Nominal Bonds
The argument accepted by the court in Faulkner that judges are capable
of setting nominal bonds does not rescue Article 334.4’s constitutionality.
Although judges theoretically have discretion to set bail at very low
amounts, the data does not show a history of judges setting low bails in
cases such as these—their practice is to set bail that is out of reach for
many indigent detainees, even when those detainees pose little safety or
flight risks.134 Second, even setting a very low bail assumes that an arrestee
has some ability to pay. Given the frequency of homeless citizens being
arrested,135 this assumption is not reasonable, and it denies equal
protection to defendants who are unable to pay even one cent to secure
their release. The existence of limited judicial discretion cannot invalidate
the equal protection concerns implicated by Article 334.4.

consider the appropriateness of non-money bonds at the hearings already being
held.” Id.
132. See infra Part III.A.
133. Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213, at *3 (E.D. La.
May 9, 2014) (“For purposes of Faulkner’s facial challenge, the Court must
assume that judges will apply the statutorily mandated factors in good faith when
setting bail for defendants charged with one of Article 334.4’s enumerated
offenses.”).
134. Faulkner, whose case was discussed exhaustively in Part II, is such an
example.
135. See generally Greg A. Greenberg & Robert A. Rosenheck, Jail Incarceration,
Homelessness, and Mental Health: A National Study, 59 PSYCHIATRIC SVCS. 170
(2008).
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1. Explanation of Statistical Analysis
An examination of bond data shows that judges do not set nominal
bonds when assessing bonds for arrestees accused of possession with
intent to distribute marijuana.136 The Louisiana Public Defender Board
maintains a database to track representation statistics.137 Bond data is not
a required field and therefore is frequently unreported; however, many
attorneys in the 15th Judicial District—a district including the city of
Lafayette—report this data.138
A query to the Louisiana Public Defender Board’s database seeking
arrestees charged in the 15th Judicial District with possession with intent
to distribute marijuana between September 1, 2013 and September 1, 2015
returns 52 results with bond data included.139 Of these, one bond was set
at zero dollars, in contravention of Article 334.4—this data point has been
discounted in the analysis. Because the database query returned all persons
accused of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, regardless of
what other crimes they were charged with, the remaining 51 data points
were divided into three groups for analysis. Group A consists of all 51 data
points and includes every individual charged with possession with intent
to distribute marijuana, regardless of other charges. Group B consists of
all arrestees charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana
along with simple possession or possession with intent to distribute other
drugs. This group consists of 18 data points.140 Group C consists only of
arrestees charged with possession with the intent to distribute marijuana
136. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:966 (2016) governs possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute.
137. See Memorandum from Jean M. Faria, State Public Defender, to the Louisiana
Public Defender Board (Nov. 30, 2009), http://lpdb.la.gov/Serving%20The
%20Public/Reports/txtfiles/pdf/SPD%20Report%20for%20December%202009.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NT6J -J9A3] (regarding, in part, the introduction of the database to the
various district defender offices and the subsequent training in its use).
138. It is possible that other judicial districts function very differently from the
15th. Unfortunately, because bond data is not currently a required field, it is
necessary to extrapolate from the 15th to obtain a picture of bond practices
statewide. This lack of data underscores the need for state-wide mandated
reporting of bond practices.
139. Access to the Louisiana Public Defender Board database is granted at the
discretion of the State Public Defender. See Appendix, infra. All calculations used
in this Comment involving the bond data are rounded to the nearest dollar.
140. One arrestee, who was arrested with a truly remarkable number and
variety of controlled substances on his person, has been excluded from this group
on the grounds that the group is intended to reflect typical drug-based arrests
where an arrestee may have had more than one controlled substance on his person.
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and consists of ten data points.141 The crime with which an arrestee is
charged affects a judge’s bond determination.142 This division allows for
more accurate analysis by controlling for people charged with crimes other
than possession with the intent to distribute marijuana.
2. Bond Data from the 15th Judicial District
The three groups vary significantly in their statistics. Group A has a
minimum bail amount of $1,500 and a maximum of $170,000. The mean
bail amount of Group A is $26,725, and the standard deviation143 is
$31,047. Group B has a minimum bail amount of $1,500 and a maximum
of $75,000. The mean bail amount of Group B is $22,778, and the standard
deviation is $21,325. Group C has a minimum bail amount of $1,500 and
a maximum of $36,000. The mean bail amount of group C is $14,350, and
the standard deviation is $14,083. As is evident from the standard
deviation, all groups display extreme variance. Group C displays the least
variance in its lower two quartiles144—the range between Group C’s
minimum to its median is only $4,750.
The analyzed data shows that a magistrate in the 15th JDC has not
assigned a “nominal” bond for arrestees charged with possession with
intent to distribute in the past two years; none of the analyzed data shows
any bond set below $1,500. Even bonds set on arrestees charged only with
possession with intent to distribute marijuana were high; 70% of bonds set
in Group C exceeded $3,125, and half of the arrestees in Group C were
assessed a bond of $6,250 or greater. Bond amounts increased
dramatically when other drug charges are added; 72% of bonds set in
Group B exceeded $5,250, and half of the arrestees in that group were
assessed a bond of $18,000 or greater.

141. Persons charged under LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1041, which prohibits
the collection of money from sales of controlled substances, have not been
excluded, because the collection of money from the sale of marijuana is a logical
conclusion of the attempt to sell marijuana.
142. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 311 (2016).
143. Standard deviation is a measurement of variation among data. A low
standard deviation indicates that data points are generally close to the mean. A
higher standard deviation indicates that the data set has more variance. For further
analysis of the data, including a box-and-whiskers plot of all datasets, see the
information appended to this article.
144. A data set may be broken into four quartiles for purposes of analysis. Each
quartile represents one fourth of the total data. The lower two quartiles of a data
set comprise the bottom half of the data.
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The Faulkner court assumed “that judges will apply the statutorily
mandated factors in good faith when setting bail for defendants charged
with one of Article 334.4’s enumerated offenses.”145 The court also
accepted the assertion of a state judge who claimed that judges may set
nominal bonds.146 The available data, however, does not support this
assumption. Instead, the available data supports the claim that Article
334.4 influences judges to assess high bonds.
B. Article 334.4 Potentially Violates Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process is “the opportunity to be heard . . . at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”147 Article 334.4 denies
certain classes of arrestees the ability to be heard “in a meaningful
manner” during bail determinations. Rather than being afforded the
opportunity to present a case for why they should be released on their own
recognizance, arrestees are forced into surety bonds that leave them in
prison, regardless of their individual circumstances. Their demonstration of
ties to the community, indigence, and relative risk cannot be considered
when determining the appropriateness of recognizance, because Article
334.4 flatly forbids release on recognizance. Therefore, their attempts to
avoid lengthy incarceration are not “meaningful,” because judges have no
discretion to release them on their own recognizance.
Because Faulkner did not prove that Article 334.4 was unconstitutional
in every application and lacked any “plainly legitimate sweep,”148 his facial
challenge failed.149 The fact that Article 334.4 is not unconstitutional in
every application, however, does not logically lead to the claim that Article
334.4 cannot be unconstitutional in any application. There exists a class of
people whose procedural due process rights may be imperiled by
application of Article 334.4.
The extremely indigent, such as the homeless, might not be able to pay
any amount of money, no matter how small. When such an arrestee is used
as the basis for a Mathews test, significant doubts are cast on the
constitutionality of Article 334.4. Although it is admittedly unlikely that a
145. Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213, at *3 (E.D. La.
May 9, 2014).
146. Id.
147. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (holding that due process required a hearing before the
termination of welfare).
148. Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213, at *2 (E.D. La.
May 9, 2014).
149. Id. at *6.
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homeless person would have the capital necessary to begin selling drugs,
Article 334.4 bans release on one’s own recognizance for several other
crimes that require no money, such as aggravated cruelty to animals.150
The Faulkner court’s argument that Article 334.4 fails to deprive arrestees
of a liberty interest collapses when an extremely indigent defendant cannot
pay any amount of bond, because the article then mandates pretrial
detention.151 Under the first Mathews factor, this scenario indicates a due
process violation.
The second factor of Mathews—the risk of the arrestee being
erroneously deprived of his liberty interest152—becomes much greater
when a person without any money—for instance, a person who is
homeless—is arrested. Because Article 344.4 is a total ban on bail without
surety, a judge in such a situation would be required to detain the arrestee
until trial. The second half of the factor—the “probable value, if any, of
additional procedural safeguards”153—is simple. Additional procedural
safeguards would simply be the ability of the court to use its own
discretion to release an arrestee on his own recognizance. The value of
such a safeguard is immediately apparent; the court would be able to
prevent the pretrial detention of persons unable to pay any amount of bail.
The court in Faulkner noted that such a possibility existed, but was by
itself insufficient to sustain a facial challenge.154 The second factor
indicates the constitutional insufficiency of Article 334.4.
The third and final factor—the interest of the government155—is
unpersuasive. Even if one were to assume, in spite of the available data,
that judges did frequently assign nominal bonds, Article 334.4 serves no
particular use. Were judges to regularly use their discretion to assign
nominal bonds in cases where they would otherwise grant release on one’s
own recognizance, the article would at best be ineffective. Article 334.4 is
troubling, because the Mathews test indicates an unconstitutional
application if a truly indigent person were subject to its ban on bail without
surety.
In Salerno, the United States Supreme Court held that the Bail Reform
Act of 1984 fell within a narrow range of exceptions to the standard that
“liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the
carefully limited exception.”156 The Court reasoned that the Act was
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:102.1 (2016); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 334.4 (2016).

LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 334.4 (2016).
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976).
Id.
Faulkner, 2014 WL 1876213, at *5–6.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
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attended by “numerous procedural safeguards,” which served to protect it
from a facial challenge.157 These safeguards included the analysis by the court
of “statutorily enumerated factors, which include the nature and the
circumstances of the charges, the weight of the evidence, the history and
characteristics of the putative offender, and the danger to the community.”158
The Faulkner court asserted that it was appropriate for the Louisiana
legislature to determine that certain offenses are too dangerous to allow
release on one’s own recognizance;159 however, to issue such a blanket ban
denies arrestees their due process rights to have ameliorating factors
considered by the court.
C. Article 334.4 Potentially Violates Equal Protection
In addition to violating due process, Article 334.4 implicates issues of
equal protection. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the
Equal Protection Clause to mean “there can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”160 Yet,
Article 334.4 would condemn the utterly indigent to a lengthy pretrial
detention, while those with money would leave prison with ease. In recent
years, bail schedules have been successfully challenged under the Equal
Protection Clause.161 Challenges to Article 334.4 are analogous to these
claims. When indigent detainees cannot be released on their own
recognizance and cannot provide surety, they are subject to pretrial
confinement despite the fact that bail without surety might well be
appropriate.
In Varden v. City of Clanton, the United States filed a Statement of
Interest arguing against the appropriateness of fixed bail schedules.162 The
reasoning of the United States is highly applicable to Article 334.4. The
United States argued that “the [Supreme] Court’s Fourteenth Amendment
analysis applies in equal, if not greater, force to individuals who are
detained until trial because of inability to pay fixed-sum bail amounts.
Liberty is particularly salient for defendants awaiting trial, who have not

157. Id.
158. Id. at 751–52.
159. Faulkner, 2014 WL 1876213, at *15.
160. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
161. See, e.g., Snow v. Lambert, 2015 WL 5071981 (M.D. La. 2015) (holding
that an Ascension Parish woman was impermissibly subjected to a fixed bail
schedule because her indigence prevented her from paying).
162. Statement of Interest of the United States, Varden v. City of Clanton, No.
2:15-cv-34-MHT-WC (N.D. Ala. filed Jan. 15, 2015).
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been found guilty of any crime.”163 Although the United States admitted
that certain situations require imprisonment before trial, it maintained that
fixed-bail schedules do not permit judges to take into account the
“individual circumstances of the accused” and require pretrial detention
for arrestees too indigent to afford the demanded fee.164 Similar to these
schedules, Article 334.4 does not permit judges to take into account the
poverty of a person who cannot pay even a nominal fee.
The Equal Protection Clause may protect the poor in criminal matters
more than in other contexts. The United States Supreme Court has
specifically ruled that “[i]n criminal trials a State can no more discriminate
on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.”165
Because pretrial detention statistically correlates to higher conviction
rates,166 keeping prisoners incarcerated before trial solely because they are
incapable of paying contravenes the principle set forth in Griffin that “the
ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational relationship to a
defendant’s guilt or innocence and [can]not be used as an excuse to
deprive a defendant of a fair trial.”167 In addition to violating equal
protection, Article 334.4 likely violates the constitutional prohibition on
excessive bail.
D. Article 334.4 Potentially Violates the Eighth Amendment Prohibition
on Excessive Bail
Salerno established that “when the Government has admitted that its
only interest is in preventing flight, bail must be set by a court at a sum
designed to ensure that goal, and no more.”168 Although Louisiana law
specifies that public safety must be considered when setting bail, bail
exists to ensure an arrestee’s presence at court.169 If an individual’s
circumstances were such that a judge would, but for Article 334.4, release
that person on his or her own recognizance, the imposition of even a
nominal bond would violate the Salerno principle.
Article 334.4 has several unconstitutional defects. First, because it
does not allow arrestees to present their case for release on recognizance
in a meaningful manner, the article violates the rights of the detained to
procedural due process. Second, the vastly disproportionate pretrial
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 8–9.
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17.
See infra note 171.
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17–18.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987).
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 334 (2016).
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outcomes between the monied and the wholly indigent indicate a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. Third, the article may violate the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on excessive bail. However, even if Article 334.4
were entirely constitutional, its significant negative effects would still
require its repeal as a matter of prudent policy.
IV. THE CASE FOR REPEAL: ARTICLE 334.4 AND
ITS DELETERIOUS EFFECTS
As shown by the Faulkner ruling, federal courts applying Louisiana
law are unable to entertain facial challenges to Article 334.4 because not
all applications of the rule are unconstitutional. The only viable option to
overturn the Article would be to have a defendant so poor that he or she
would be incapable of paying any bond. Additionally, mootness and
ripeness issues make the challenge of even an ideal defendant difficult.170
The proper solution to the problem of Article 334.4 is to have the
Louisiana legislature repeal it. Article 334.4 is bad policy, and its
enforcement leads to several unforeseen consequences.
A. Article 334.4 Affects the Outcomes of Trials by Mandating Expensive
Pretrial Detention
The Arnold Foundation has published several studies on the effects of
pretrial detention.171 Defendants who are detained until trial are
significantly more likely to be sentenced to jail than those who are released
before their trial.172 Additionally, those who are detained until trial receive
170. See supra Part I.E.
171. CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF
PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING OUTCOMES 4 (2013), http://www.arnoldfounda
tion.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_state-sentencing_FNL.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/CY5S-6U6H] [hereinafter INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT]; CHRISTOPHER T.
LOWENKAMP ET AL., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 19 (2013),
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads /2014/02/LJAF_Report_hiddencosts_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7UB-PUFL] [hereinafter HIDDEN COSTS OF
PRETRIAL DETENTION].
172. INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT, supra note 171 (“Defendants who are
detained for the entire pretrial period are much more likely to be sentenced to jail
and prison. Low-risk defendants who are detained for the entire pretrial period are
5.41 times more likely to be sentenced to jail and 3.76 times more likely to be
sentenced to prison when compared to low-risk defendants who are released at
some point before trial or case disposition. Moderate and high-risk defendants
who are detained for the entire pretrial period are approximately 3 times more
likely to be incarcerated than similar defendants who are released at some point.”).
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longer sentences, with low-risk defendants experiencing the greatest
disparity in sentences.173 This difference in sentencing may be due to
desperation on the part of the defendant who is confined, which causes the
defendant to accept plea agreements that a non-incarcerated person would
refuse.174 This disparity is serious cause for concern, especially given that
the United States Supreme Court has affirmed that “there can be no equal
justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money
he has.”175
Heightened risk for conviction and sentencing is not the only
damaging effect of the pretrial incarceration that Article 334.4 causes.
There is a statistically significant link between pretrial incarceration and
recidivism.176 Additionally, recent research calls into question the effect
of pretrial incarceration on rates of appearance in court.177 Given the
173. Id. at 10 (“When other relevant statistical controls are considered,
defendants detained until trial or case disposition are 4.44 times more likely to be
sentenced to jail and 3.32 times more likely to be sentenced to prison than
defendants who are released at some point pending trial. The jail sentence is 2.78
times longer for defendants who are detained for the entire pretrial period, and the
prison sentence is 2.36 times longer.”).
174. RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE
MISUSE OF JAILS IN AMERICA 14 (2015), http://vera.org/sites/default/files
/resources/downloads/incarcerations-front-door-report_02.pdf [https://perma.cc
/4ZLE-YHDG] (“Earlier research ha[s] noted that those held pretrial may be more
likely to receive custodial as well as longer sentences because defendants already
in jail receive and accept less favorable plea agreements and do not have the
leverage to press for better ones.”).
175. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
176. HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION, supra note 171 (“Being
detained for the entire pretrial period is related to the likelihood of postdisposition recidivism. When other relevant statistical controls are considered,
pretrial detention had a statistically significant and positive (meaning increasing)
effect on 12-month [new criminal activity post-disposition] and 24-month [new
criminal activity post-disposition]. Defendants detained pretrial were 1.3 times
more likely to recidivate compared to defendants who were released at some point
pending trial. This association could indicate that there are unknown factors that
cause both detention and recidivism, but it is an association worthy of further
exploration.”).
177. Id. at 10 (“Overall, when other relevant statistical controls are considered,
defendants who are detained 2 to 3 days pretrial are slightly more likely to [fail to
appear] than defendants who are detained 1 day (1.09 times more likely). Examining
sub-populations of defendants revealed significant differences, however, in the
impact of length of pretrial detention when considering defendant risk level.
Specifically, low-risk defendants are more likely to [fail to appear] if they are
detained 2 to 3 days (1.22 times more likely than low-risk defendants detained 1
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current data, the government interest in having arrestees appear in court
and in protecting the public actually appears to be thwarted, and not
furthered, by pretrial detention.
Pretrial detention does not only affect the justice system; it affects the
treasury as well. In 2015, the city of New Orleans estimated a daily cost
of $97 per prisoner in its parish prisons.178 In the same year, East Baton
Rouge Parish, which sends prisoners to other parishes as a result of jail
overcrowding, estimated a cost daily of $60–70 per prisoner.179 With an
inmate population in the thousands in both cities,180 any change to pretrial
detention rates will play a significant factor in municipal budgets.
B. Revisions of Article 334.4 Will Be Ineffective
Alternatives to the repeal of Article 334.4 would be ineffective. One
alternative would be to rewrite the article to order that judges keep in mind
the severity of the enumerated crimes currently contained within the article
when assessing bond. However, the first factor of Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure Article 334 requires judges to assess “[t]he seriousness of the
offense charged, including but not limited to whether the offense is a crime of
violence or involves a controlled dangerous substance.”181 Rewriting Article
334.4 in such a manner would prove redundant.
Another alternative would be to urge judges to assess more nominal
bonds. Although preferable to the current state of affairs, this alternative
seems a tortuous circumvention of a needless law. If judges were to assign
more nominal bonds, and assuming arguendo that all arrestees were able
day or less), 4 to 7 days (1.22 times more likely), and 15 to 30 days (1.41 times
more likely).”).
178. Paul Purpura, Jackson Square Shooter’s Odyssey at Orleans Parish
Priso n Fin a lly End s , T IM E S P IC AY U N E ( J ul. 2 9 , 2 0 15 , 9 :19 P M) ,
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/07/jackson_square_shooters_orlean.
html [https://perma.cc /7EWE-ZQ6J]. It should be noted that this estimation took
place before the opening of a new multimillion dollar facility, which replaced
several aging jails in the parish. For more information on the New Orleans Parish
jail facility, see Jonathan Bullington, First Inmates Arrive at Orleans Parish New
Jail Facility , T IMES PICAYUNE (Sept. 14, 2015, 12:41 P M),
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/09/orleans_parish_jail_opens.html
[https://perma.cc/AKN5-XQZD].
179. Prison Privatization Might Save Baton Rouge Money, But is There a Higher
Cost?, TIMES PICAYUNE (Feb. 1, 2015, 2:40 AM), http://www.nola.com /news/batonrouge/index.ssf/2015/01/baton_rouge_private_prison_tax.html [https//per ma.cc/CM
S2-NY2M].
180. Purpura, supra note 178; see also id.
181. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 334 (2016).
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to pay such bonds, the net effect would be identical to allowing judges to
release arrestees on their own recognizance.
C. Article 334.4 Must be Repealed
Arguments in support of Article 334.4 are unavailing. Repealing the
article will not prohibit judges from denying release on one’s own
recognizance; rather, repealing the article will allow judges to use their
own discretion on the matter. The fact that homeless members of society
can be more difficult to locate for trial than their more fortunate
counterparts is indisputable, but repealing Article 334.4 would mean only
that judges would consider this factor when determining whether to grant
bail in such cases. Were Article 334.4 repealed, a judge would be free to
deny release on recognizance—or indeed, even mandate pretrial
detention—for a homeless arrestee who posed a risk of flight or
recidivism. However, the same judge would be able to grant release on
recognizance for a homeless arrestee found to be a negligible flight risk
under such a regime. As to the potential argument that incarceration would
somehow be preferable to being homeless, there exist multiple homeless
shelters across the state that provide much healthier accommodations than
parish prison facilities—many of which the U.S. Department of Justice has
taken over via consent decrees, alleging inadequate protection from
violence and sexual assault, inadequate suicide protection, inadequate
medical and mental health care, and other severe constitutional
deficiencies.182
Article 334.4 is at best a meaningless legislative gesture. If under the
current statute judges are assessing nominal bail at the same rate that they
released arrestees on their own recognizance before Article 334.4, the only
change is that extremely indigent arrestees are being needlessly denied
freedom; otherwise, the court is currently releasing the same arrestees it
would under the previous statutory scheme. If, however, the article is
causing judges to assess bail at a higher rate than before its passage, it is
causing needless, expensive, and unjust incarceration. Article 334.4
accomplishes nothing of value and should be repealed.
CONCLUSION
Article 334.4 allows for a situation in which the indigent may languish
in jail while their peers, identical to them in all regards save wealth, are
182. Letter from the U.S. Department of Justice to Marlin N. Gusman, Orleans
Parish Sheriff (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt
/legacy/2012/04/23/parish_update_4-23-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQU9-M4RH].
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freed pending trial. It implicates issues of due process, equal protection,
and excessive bail. By establishing a prophylactic ban on bail without
surety, Article 334.4 denies arrestees their due process right to a fair
consideration of the statutory bail factors. It keeps the penniless in prison
solely because they cannot afford to pay a bond amount, in violation of the
principles of equal protection. It imposes excessive bail on defendants for
whom, but for the existence of the article, judges would assess a nominal
bond. Data shows that the resulting pretrial incarceration leads to
deleterious outcomes, both for the imprisoned and for society at large, by
affecting the conviction rates and sentence lengths of the accused. To do
nothing in the face of such information is irresponsible. The Louisiana
legislature should act to improve the equity of the state criminal justice
system by repealing Article 334.4.

Gabriel Loupe

 J.D./D.C.L., 2017, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
Special thanks are owed to Orleans Public Defenders, whose efforts in managing the
effects of Article 334.4 on their clients provided the seed for this Comment.
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APPENDIX: LOUISIANA BOND DATA
Group A (All arrestees charged with possession with intent to
distribute marijuana and any other offense)
Mean: $26,725
Standard deviation: $31,047
Minimum: $1,500
1st Quartile: $6,000
Median: $19,250
3rd Quartile: $36,000
Maximum: $170,000
Group B (Arrestees charged with possession with intent to distribute
marijuana and any other drug offense)
Mean: $22,778
Standard deviation: $21,325
Minimum: $1,500
1st Quartile: $5,250
Median: $18,000
3rd Quartile: $33,250
Maximum: $75,000
Group C (Arrestees charged with possession with intent to distribute
marijuana only)
Mean: $14,350
Standard deviation: $14,083
Minimum: $1,500
1st Quartile: $3,125
Median: $6,250
3rd Quartile: $24,375
Maximum: $36,000
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POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE MARIJUANA
BOND AMOUNTS IN THE 15TH JDC, 9/1/13 TO 9/1/15
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